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IN SISTERHOOD
MARl MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY?
Boston: Beacon Press, 1996. 207 pp.
Reviewed by Lisa C. Ikemoto*
I am writing this review from Los Angeles, California, during
the new years of infamy.1 In 1994, the majority of California voters in
the November elections said "yes" to anti-immigrant Proposition
1872 and "yes" to the racist crime bill known as "three strikes."3 In
November, 1996, the majority of California voters again voted "yes,"
this time for anti-affirmative action, anti-diversity Proposition 209.4
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1996, Congress passed the so-called
"welfare reform" bill5 and the "Defense of Marriage Act."6 By identi-
fying these events as markers of the new years of infamy, I am not
drawing direct comparisons between these times and Executive Or-
der 9066 and the resulting internment of more than 120,000 Japanese
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. B.A. 1984, University of California at Los
Angeles; J.D. 1987, University of California at Davis School of Law; LL.M. 1989,
Columbia University School of Law.
1. Some refer to the internment of over 120,000 Japanese Americans and Japanese
Latin Americans as "the years of infamy." See, e.g., MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1976) (using government
documents to prove the spurious nature of the "military necessity" rationale for the
internment and to reveal that racism, economic exploitation, and a hostage-reserve
plan actually motivated the internment).
2. For the full text of Proposition 187, see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 app. at 787-91 (C.D. Cal. 1995). In League of United Latin
American Citizens, District Court Judge Marianna Pfaelzer held that several provisions
of Proposition 187, including those that would exclude undocumented immigrants
from public elementary and secondary schools and would deny public and social
services to undocumented immigrants, were legally invalid.
3. Diane Young, Props 186 and 188 Rejected by Voters: Three Strikes' Amendment
Approved, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at B4.
4. For excerpts from the text of Proposition 209 and accompanying ballot state-
ments, as well as an analysis of the potential effects of the initiative, see Coalition for
Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996). In this case, District Court
Judge Thelton Henderson granted a preliminary injunction enjoining state officials
from implementing Proposition 209. Id. On April 8, 1997, a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted the injunction. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wil-
son, 1997 WL 160667 (9th Cir., Apr. 8, 1997). The A.C.L.U. is planning to petition for a
rehearing en banc. Maura Dolan, U.S. Panel Upholds Prop. 209 Affirmative Action, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at Al.
5. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 2105).
6. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N (110 Stat. 2419) 2905.
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Americans in 1942. I am, however, pointing to historically-based
ideologies that link these two periods of time.
The systems of subordination that justified the imprisonment of
the west coast Japanese American population and the kidnapping
and imprisonment of Japanese Latin Americans has shifted in aim,
means, and scope so that those of Japanese descent no longer
consistently bear the most obvious brunt of these systems. Now
others, some Asian American and some Latino, occupy social-
political positions similar to those who were subject to Executive
Order 9066. In addition, the shifts in the lines of subordination have
resulted in new expressions of nativism as well as the invigoration
of long-lived forms of it. The immigration restrictions in Proposition
187 and in the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act ("welfare reform")
disproportionately impact immigrants of color-Latinos and Asian
Americans. The anti-affirmative action laws, the three strikes laws,
and the "welfare reform" laws narrow the standards for good
citizenship that tacitly exemplarize the white middle class, creating
expansive standards for bad citizenship that captures people of
color, most of whom are poor, for punishment and social
experimentation.
At the same time, these laws restate the political rhetoric that
the family is a microcosm of the nation. These laws, collectively, dis-
rupt the family lives of tens of thousands of people of color-by
preventing unification and reunification, by denying means of pro-
viding food, shelter, and care, and by denying the worth and the
hope behind the work, care, and education that family members
have already provided. The message sent by these disruptions is that
these families are not deserving of protection. When this message is
read together with the refusal to recognize that committed same-sex
relationships deserve legal protections and benefits, the effect is the
privileging of the white, middle class, male-centered family, and its
counterpart, white, middle class, male-centered nationhood.
So what does this have to do with the book? From the title on-
ward, scholar-activist Mari J. Matsuda calls upon us to think
critically about identity and the role of history and ideology in the
formation of identity. "Where is your body?," as a critical activist's
question, asks each of us to think about where we stand relative to
the axes of subordination, and where we should be in order to push
forward social justice. The events mentioned above flow determi-
nately from prior events and the ideologies in which they arose-
events and ideologies addressed in this book. They are linked to
domestic violence, to racist hate speech, to sexual harassment, to the
murder of Vincent Chin, to English-only laws, to the extremely high
casualty rate among Japanese Americans who fought in World War
II, and to the burning of Chinatowns. In this collection of essays, the
links among these events and practices, made by the interlocking
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systems of subordination, become clear. In the process, Professor
Matsuda illustrates that doing theory can be concrete and that doing
critical theory can be constructive.
These essays were written and spoken during the last decade.
The earliest dates back to the moments in 1987 when critical race
theory was first emerging as such in legal scholarship.7 The themes
and issues addressed reflect both the points of controversy in which
race, gender, class, and sexual orientation have converged in the last
ten years and the development of race and gender-conscious critical
theory during the same period. The essays are arranged in three sec-
tions that express three overlapping themes: identity and politics,
language and power, and the use of a standpoint position that is
explicitly left and political and that speaks of being a person of color,
a woman, an Asian American, a Sansei feminist of Okinawan and
Japanese descent. Professor Matsuda wrote these essays as speeches,
and hence, in her speaking voice. Her passion and her points come
through, making the theory accessible and alive.
The passion with which Professor Matsuda speaks and her
standpoint as a Sansei feminist make her words and insights valu-
able and original, even years after they were first spoken and heard.
I have the poster for the first Women of Color and the Law confer-
ence at Yale in April, 1988. It was my first year out of law school, my
first year in teaching, and my first time at a law conference. I re-
member seeing and hearing law professors Patricia Williams, Judy
Scales-Trent, and Elaine Jones of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund. I remember Mari Matsuda, a Sansei woman who
spoke fiercely about two white women, the Grinke sisters, and how
they embraced their Black nephew in 1868, about the use of quail
calls on the underground railroad, about the links between abolition
and feminism, and about how we sisters of color could use multiple
consciousness, and not deny our own experience.8 The possibilities I
and other women learned about at this conference, at the 1989 Uni-
versity Conference commemorating the 35h anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education," and on other occasions, were in part raised by
seeing a sister, a sister of color, a Sansei sister, and reading ourselves
in her. More significantly, the space Mari Matsuda has helped open
arises from her voice as a Sansei woman who has claimed race and
7. MARI J. MATSUDA, We the People: Jurisprudence in Color, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?
21, 21-27 (1996).
8. For the text of Matsuda's speech, see Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
9. Professor Matsuda presented, Where Is Your Body?: Protest and Social Transforma-
tion, at this conference. See MATSUDA, Where Is Your Body?: Protest and Transformation,
in WHERE IS YOURBODY? supra note 7, at 73, 73, 80 n.1.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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gender in a way that is not Black, not White, but affirmative and
filled with conviction.
The first set of essays, grouped under "Politics and Identity,"
includes two essays that document the beginnings of critical race
theory. We the People: Jurisprudence in Color" marks the political con-
flict that arose within the AALS Minority Groups Section. The other,
Critical Race Theory, 2 followed the call for a critical theory of race
and law issued, in part, out of frustration with the failure of critical
legal studies scholars to acknowledge the significance of racism in
law. For those of us who began doing critical race theory after it was
recognized as such, reading these essays and seeing in them the
tensions from which they arose is illuminating and humbling. For
second generation critical race theorists, it is easy to underestimate
the conviction required to make the initial break with the main-
stream of scholars of color and with the "mainstream" of critical
legal scholars. It is also easy to lose sight of the provocative nature of
the basic premises of critical race theory-that race plays a central
role in American law and society, that race and racism are social
constructs with political purpose and effect, that justice must be
must be anti-racist and conceived by hearing the voices from the
bottom. 3 In these essays, Professor Matsuda speaks boldly and with
conviction. She acknowledges the naysayer's point that these prem-
ises are not original to critical race theory, and she goes on to affirm
the use of a progressive identity politics to replace the vulgar na-
tionalism implicit in both liberal and conservative racial discourse.
In four of these essays, Professor Matsuda speaks from a per-
spective that is expressly feminist and race-conscious. The ways in
which she acknowledges the connections between racism and patri-
archy on the one hand, and feminist jurisprudence and critical race
theory on the other, form a list of useful methodologies. The book's
first essay, When the First Quail Calls,"5 argues that the multiple con-
sciousness of women, and particularly of women of color, be used as
a critical tool. In each of the essays, Professor Matsuda uses histori-
cal examples to illustrate the ideological roots of current racist,
patriarchal, and heterosexist practices. She persistently grounds the
discussions by identifying how these ideologies currently cause
material harms. She reminds us to always ask the other questions-
11. MATSUDA, supra note 7, at 21-27.
12. MATSUDA, Critical Race Theory, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 47, 47-
59.
13. See id.; MATSUDA, supra note 7, at 21-27.
14. See MATSUDA, On Identity Politics, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 13,
17-19.
15. MATSUDA, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 4, 4-12.
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if the issue or practice apparently results from racism, then how do
patriarchy and homophobia operate there. Throughout the years,
Professor Matsuda has remained a pragmatist, often using seem-
ingly contradictory claims to simultaneously critique and push for
change. And she has consistently argued that we must understand
subordination from within coalition.
The second set of essays explores the connections between
language discrimination, hate speech regulation, and sexual
harassment. The first key insight Professor Matsuda offers is shown
in the way she frames the issue in Who Owns Speech? English-only
laws claim ownership and control on nativist grounds. 6 Opposition
to the regulation of hate speech and sexual harassment asserts
academic freedom as the justifiable reason, but claims control and
dominion on racist and patriarchal grounds. 7 The essays, Who Owns
Speech? 8 and Assaultive Speech and Academic Freedom,9 expose the
contradiction that arises when the claim of freedom justifies using
speech itself as a means of control.
There is a thread that runs from this point about contradiction
to the essay, Feminism and Property, in Part 1.20 The connection has to
do with who has control and dominion in each case. And it has to
do with how the public and private spaces are deployed with
respect to property and speech sites. The home is private property,
and therefore protected space. But protected for whom? The result in
many cases, as Professor Matsuda shows, is that for women abused
in their own homes, the fact of equal ownership rights is a legal shell
only, and "not the ultimate sign of liberty and personhood the law
imagines." 21 In Who Owns Speech?, Professor Matsuda points out
"that we do not protect speech that hurts property or reputation
interests, but somehow when speech targets women, Jews, or gays,
or people of color for assault, this is seen as 'political' and therefore
protected., 22 So if it is speech at issue, then the fact that a person or
group has been made visible and therefore public by
marginalization also makes them political and fair game. In the
speech context, the law apparently protects public political space.
But as in the property context, it is the private that receives real
protection. Identities privileged by whiteness and masculinity
16. See MATSUDA, Who Owns Speech?: Violence and Linguistic Space, in WHERE IS
YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 83, 86-91.
17. See MATSUDA, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment, in WHERE IS YOUR
BODY?, supra note 7, at 103, 104-06.
18. MATSUDA, supra note 16, at 83-101.
19. MATSUDA, supra note 17, at 103-17.
20. MATSUDA, Feminism and Property, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 29,
29-36.
21. Id. at 35.
22. MATSUDA, supra note 16, at 95.
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remain noncontroversial, invisible,23 undiscussed, and therefore
cloaked in privacy.24 In both cases, the target of assault becomes a
site. The battered woman is claimed as private property. The
marginal group becomes a public space. The conflation of site and
person arises directly from the refusal to acknowledge Professor
Matsuda's point, that control, and not freedom, is at issue in these
cases. The connections among the themes in this book become clear
and interactive as one progresses through it.
Professor Matsuda's second key insight begins with the point
that the speech/conduct distinction in First Amendment doctrine is
a false one. Her central point is that some speech, such as hate
speech, causes material harm, and that regulating such speech is
necessary to effect the principles of anti-subordination and toler-
ance. 25 I was taught to respond to racial slurs with the chant, "sticks
and stones. . . ." I perceived my inability to internalize the lesson of
that chant as my own failure. Thus, the speech/conduct distinction
in First Amendment doctrine shifts the burden to the targets of vio-
lent speech. Civil libertarians who would teach their children not to
use racial slurs, to remember the Holocaust, and to abhor the Ku
Klux Klan, would still defend the legal right of others to engage in
these speech acts. In straddling the speech/conduct line, these civil
libertarians undermine their own lessons. More importantly, they
shift the blame for the failure of speech to its targets. When Professor
Matsuda, other critical race scholars, and radical feminists argued
for restrictions on violent speech, many of us recognized the right-
ness of their claims in the relief we felt from that imposed sense of
failure.
The third set of essays focus on Asian American identity. These
essays, written as speeches for Asian American audiences, elaborate
upon the principles of progressive identity politics in the context of
"Asian American" identity. The title piece, We Will Not Be Used, was
given at a 1990 fundraising dinner for one of the leading Asian
American civil rights organizations, the Asian Law Caucus.26 The
Asian Law Caucus is celebrating its 25" anniversary this year, 1997.
And now we can see that Professor Matsuda's admonishment to
Asian Americans, to resist the draw of being the "racial
23. See STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED (1996).
24. I believe this is closely related to the fact that "race" usually refers to non-white,
even though "white" is a racial designation. In addition, I am reminded of artist-
scholar Keith Aoki's point that while models for caricaturing non-White identities are
all too common, it is difficult to think of ways to caricature whiteness. Conversation
with Professor Keith Aoki.
25. MATSUDA, supra note 16, at 97-98.
26. See MATSUDA, We Will Not Be Used: Are Asian Americans the Racial Bourgeoisie?,
in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 149, 149.
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bourgeoisie," the model minority, and the racial wedge,27 anticipated
the crisis of identity expressed in recent debates about affirmative
action and immigration restrictions. In these debates, Asian
Americans have split over how to occupy what Professor Matsuda
calls the "racial middle."28 Some of us have, as she feared, assumed
the role of the honorary White, thus reinforcing white supremacy.
Others are trying to resist the draw by doing, as suggested, coalition
work.2
Professor Matsuda's sketch of the evolution of "Asian
American" as political construct demonstrates how a critical
understanding of identity makes the necessity of coalition obvious.0
She points to the fact that "Asian American" is a political
construction and juxtaposes that to the fact that many of the gains
for Asian Americans were made by looking beyond Asian America
to those linked to us by race, labor concerns, educational needs, and
other social factors. In these essays, the breadth of Professor
Matsuda's vision of social justice becomes more clear. Because of the
ways that we are linked to other marginalized groups, Asian
Americans cannot only oppose English-only laws and immigration
restrictions, and solely focus on issues that speak of our own
experiences; Asian Americans must also oppose racism and other
forms of subordination that sometimes impact more directly on our
31partners in coalition. Professor Matsuda argues for a conscious use
of identity based on these positions.32 In doing so, she defines the
anti-subordination principle that runs through these essays in
affirmative terms.
The lessons from these essays would serve us well in the new
years of infamy. The multi-front attack in the name of family,
citizenship, and nationhood is coordinated by lines of subordination
that extend beyond particular identity groups. We as people of color,
as Asian Americans, as Sansei women, as gay men and lesbians, as
immigrants and U.S.-born, need to identify the specific ways in
which these laws operate against us and each other. We can only do
this effectively through coalition. Addressing one issue, affirmative
action for example, is manageable. But addressing it without
acknowledging the other fronts is incomplete, just as speaking to
issues that only directly implicate us is incomplete and limits the
potential scope of social justice. We will, hopefully, take history and
27. Id. at 151-55.
28. Id. at 150.
29. Id.
30. See MATSUDA, Why Are We Here? Thoughts on Asian-American Identity and Hon-
oring Asian-Americans in Congress, in WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, supra note 7, at 171, 173.
31. Id. at 177-78.
32. Id.
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ideology into account as we work toward self-identity and voice our
countering narratives; we will use the critical tools necessary to
think and act as individuals and community members engaged in
developing anti-subordination theory and practice. We will, in other
words, join hands with Professor Matsuda, in the name of
sisterhood, inclusive community and liberation.
